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Abstract: Consequence reasoning is a major element for operation support system to assess the plant 
situations. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate how Multilevel Flow Models can be used to reason about 
consequences of disturbances in complex engineering systems. MFM is a modelling methodology for representing 
process knowledge for complex systems. It represents the system by using means-end and part-whole 
decompositions, and describes not only the purposes and functions of the system but also the causal relations 
between them. Thus MFM is a tool for causal reasoning. The paper introduces MFM modelling syntax and gives 
detailed reasoning formulas for consequence reasoning. The reasoning formulas offers basis for developing rule-
based system to perform consequence reasoning based on MFM, which can be used for alarm design, risk 
monitoring, and supervision and operation support system design. 
Keywords: Multilevel Flow Modelling, knowledge representation, functional modelling, consequence reasoning, 
rule-based system, decision support system. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
While operating complex industrial plants, the operators are 
required to be able to manage disturbances by performing 
manual interventions to the system. For disturbance 
management, it is crucial that operators are able to assess the 
disturbance situation at the system level. System level 
situation assessment is a major task for decision support 
system so it can assist the operators in making intervention 
plans when disturbances emerge. Petersen (2001) proposed to 
use a functional modelling approach, namely Multilevel Flow 
Modelling (MFM), to do situation assessment, and developed 
a root-cause reasoning system based MFM. In addition to 
identification of root causes, one of the major elements in 
situation assessment is to make projections of future plant 
status based on the understanding of current situations 
(Endsley et. al. 2003). MFM’s capability for consequence 
reasoning is a major contribution to the situation assessment 
applications.  Other researches also propose that consequence 
reasoning based on MFM can be used for alarm design (Us 
et. al. 2011) and risk monitoring systems (Yoshikawa et. al. 
2011), which are also related to operation decision support 
systems. 
MFM is a modelling methodology for representing complex 
systems in different abstraction level of specifications. It has 
been used for modelling engineering system in several safety 
critical domains such as nuclear power plant (Lind et. al. 
2011, Gola 2012) and oil/gas gathering system (Wu et. al. 
2011).  The conceptual foundations, the development of 
MFM modelling language, tools, and applications have been 
undergoing for more than two decades. The most recent 
introduction for MFM can be found in (Lind 2011a). One of 
the most important features for MFM is that the models 
describe the causality of the system functions in a formalized 
way so causal reasoning can be performed based on the MFM 
models (manually or by using software tools). Lind (2011b) 
has introduced the fundamental principles for reasoning 
about causes and consequences in MFM. However, the 
introduction is not sufficient for readers to perform analysis 
based on MFM.  
The aim of this paper is to further elaborate in details how to 
reason about consequences in MFM. To fulfil this purpose, 
basic MFM syntax has to be formulated first, as it is pre-
required for understanding the reasoning process. Then the 
paper provides detailed reasoning patterns and the inference 
formulas for MFM consequence reasoning, so it can serve as 
the basis for the readers to analyse MFM models. The paper 
is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the MFM and 
its syntax. Section 3 explains different inference formulas 
according to the predefined MFM patterns. Section 4 presents 
how rule based system can be implemented for MFM 
consequence reasoning. An example is given in Section 5 to 
demonstrate how the rule-based system works and Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
2. MFM AND MFM SYNTAX 
MFM is a modelling method representing an industrial plant 
as a system which provides the means required to serve 
purposes in its environment (Lind 2011a). MFM models 
incorporate goals and objectives of the system, functions and 
structures that describe the physical components, and 
relations between functions and structures. It also adopts a 
predefined graphical modelling language, with symbolic 
  
 
     
representation for objectives, functions and relations. This 
section provides an overview of the MFM and its syntax.  
2.1  MFM Symbols 
A list of the basic MFM symbols is shown in Table 1. A 
typical MFM model contains several flow structures and each 
flow structure contains partial function models to serve as 
means to realize functions in other flow structures or 
objectives/threats. Causal relations are used to describe the 
cause effect relations between functions within the same flow 
structure, while means-end relations describe the 
dependencies across levels. Each means-end relation is 
labelled with a main function which directly influences the 
end function in another flow level or an objective/threat. A 
full model shown in Fig. 1 is a MFM representation of a 
watermill that introduced in (Lind 2011a).  
 
Fig. 1. MFM model for a watermill 
Table 1. MFM Symbols 
Flow Functions (Special Balances) Targets Control 
   
 
 
 
Function Structures Means-end Relations 
 
 
Causal Relations 
 
Because MFM semantic is in development, the scope of the 
paper needs to be specified. The following topics are not 
included in the discussion of this paper.  
 Note that MFM can also represent control process 
(Heussen et. al. 2010, Lind 2011c) in the system. 
However other concepts are required for reasoning about 
control functions, which are not the focus of this paper. 
Therefore the control functions will not be included 
below.  
 Also notice that the four special balances all share the 
property of a normal balance but with additional 
meanings which is required by some industries such as 
chemical engineering. These four functions will not be 
distinguished in this paper. 
 Barrier is a special flow functions because it often serves 
the safety purpose in a system. The consequences of 
barrier failure need special treatment which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. (Lind 2012) 
2.2  MFM Reasoning 
As exemplified in Fig. 1, MFM constructs the model by using 
building blocks that correspond to functions and goals. It 
describes energy and mass flow structures in a physical 
system with different level of decompositions, and the 
representation is in an abstracted way which is independent 
of individual components in the physical systems. 
MFM modelling is not only a way of representation, but also 
a convenient tool to analyse and reason about the system 
performance. Reasoning in MFM models is based on 
dependency relations between states of objectives and 
functions. Each function can be either enabled or disabled. 
For any enabled functions, the possible states are listed in 
Table 2. Note that the disabling of the function is not another 
state of the function, but means that the function will no 
longer be available for the system. For example, a no flow 
transport is different from a disabled transport, for the former 
lost the object that it has been transport but the latter lost the 
ability to transport thus the node can be viewed as a barrier 
after disabling.  
Table 2. MFM States 
Function Possible States 
Source: normal, high volume, low volume 
Sink: normal, high volume, low volume 
Transport: normal, high flow, low flow,  no flow  
Storage: normal, high volume, low volume  
Barrier: normal, leak 
Balance: normal, fill, leak, unbalance 
Threat: exist, non-exist 
Objective: false, true  
The dependency relations defined in MFM are independent 
of the particular modelling object, and only based on 
predefined patterns. The patterns are created by different 
combinations of MFM entities, states and the MFM relations. 
They are defined by cause-effect relations. This will be 
thoroughly explained in section 3. 
  
 
     
2.3  A brief summary of MFM Syntax 
Before we go into the detail of the reasoning process, basic 
MFM syntax needs to be formulated. Firstly, it is important 
to distinguish two levels of connection in MFM models: flow 
connection and causal connection. Graphically, MFM 
describes flow functions as symbols and dependency 
relations as links. The mass or energy flow through a 
function structure only by means of transport functions. 
Therefore, transport functions connect other flow functions in 
a sense (though the functions are not graphically connected 
together but through a causality link). For example, a cooling 
system can be described in a highly abstracted function 
model by using MFM symbols as Fig. 2 (a). Energy (heat) 
generate from a heat source “sou1” and being transported to a 
heat sink “sin1”. Without the transport function “tra1”, 
there’s no means for the energy to be transported from the 
sou2 to sin2. Fig. 2 (b) shows a syntactically wrong model. In 
MFM, a transport function is the only function to change the 
location of the object. Therefore, each pair of flow functions 
has to be connected by a transport function.  The causality 
link “in2” does not suggest transport of mass/energy flow. 
(a) 
 
(√) 
(b) 
 
(X) 
Fig. 2. Correct vs. incorrect connections 
There’re two types of causal influences in MFM as 
introduced in (Lind 2011b). Transport functions have direct 
influence on their neighbouring functions because how much 
is transported in or out will affect the states of those of the 
neighbouring functions. However, the upstream (sou1) and 
downstream (sin1) function may or may not always influence 
the state of the transport (tra1). The causal influence from 
non-transport functions to their neighbouring transports 
(which are categorised as indirect influence) is described by 
MFM causal relations. These relations are represented by 
arrow links between functions as shown in section 2.1. The 
influence direction is always from a non-transport function to 
a transport function, thus the arrow tip is always on the 
transport. A pointed tip represents an influencer relation, 
which means that abnormal states will influence the transport 
state. A square tip represents a participant relation, which 
describe that the neighbouring functions will not influence 
the transport as long as it has enough source for input and 
enough space for output. These relations will result in 
differences in the reasoning for the same function 
combinations.  
Means-end relations describe the relations between flow 
structures, and thus cannot be used within one flow structure.  
MFM means-end relations can be categorized in two groups. 
Producer-product and mediate relations indicate the influence 
between two flow structures is instantaneous thus no 
temporal delay occurs during the shift of goal function 
perspectives.  Whereas the other four means-end relations 
indicate the influence goes through an objective, which is a 
condition for another flow structure. Thus produce, maintain, 
destroy, and supress relations link one flow structure and an 
objective/threat which are conditioning a function in another 
flow structure. There is a limited set of combinations that one 
can use when modelling means-end relations because the 
other combinations are not semantically correct. The allowed 
combination of means-end relations and their targets are 
showed in Fig. 3. (Lind 2012) 
 
Fig. 3. Allowed link combinations across level 
Only objectives are subject to be produced and maintained, 
while threats can only be destroyed and supressed. Also, only 
an objective can be the condition of enabling a function while 
the appearance of a threat will disable the function. This are 
consistent with common sense knowledge. 
Among MFM functions, the source has only one out-port 
connection and a sink has only one in-port connection. This 
means that each sink or source function can only be 
connected with one transport function. Storage and balance 
are multiple-in-port and -out-port functions. This means that 
a storage function or a balance function has at least one 
transport connected to each side respectively. A transport has 
single in-port and single out-port, which means that a 
transport function can only connected two other flow 
functions. MFM syntax also demands that all the flow 
functions in one model must be and can only be included in 
one flow structures and each function has to be linked to 
other functions with causal relations (no floating functions). 
Each flow structures have to be linked to one or more other 
flow structures through means-end relations (no floating flow 
structures).  
3. CONSEQUENCE REASONING 
In this section, reasoning about MFM patterns within the 
same flow structure are first considered. Then we introduce 
cross flow structure reasoning. With MFM patterns that are in 
the same flow structure, we distinguish direct and indirect 
influence. In section 3.1 and 3.2 only patterns without 
balance is considered. Transport balance patterns with both 
direct influence and indirect influence are explained in 
section 3.3. Finally, how to reason across level will be 
introduced in section 3.4 and 3.5. In this section, all the 
reasoning formulas are describing possible consequences 
from abnormal states (causes) and the inference are not 
reversible. 
  
 
     
3.1  Inference of Direct Influence 
Direct influence is a cause-effect relation between a transport 
state to the states its neighbouring functions. After 
considering the MFM syntax, it is easy to deduce that only 
source and storage can be the upstream function for transport, 
meanwhile only storage and sink can be the downstream 
function connected to a transport. Both influencer and 
participant relations describe the indirect influences, but these 
relations do not affect the direct inference. An inference will 
start from a proposition (either evidence or a prediction) of 
the transport state under the assumption that the non-transport 
function is enabled. The consequence inferences are shown in 
Table 3. 
Table 3. Inference Formulas of Direct Influence 
Inference upstream:   
 
Cause Consequence 
tra1-4 
high flow 
sto1-2, sou1-2 
low volume 
tra1-4 
low flow 
sto1-2, sou1-2 
high volume 
Inference downstream: 
 
Cause Consequence 
tra5-8 
high flow 
sto3-4, sin1-2 
high volume 
tra5-8 
low flow 
sto3-4,sin1-2 
low volume 
Assumption: sou1-2, sto1-2, sin1-2 are enabled 
When a transport function is in a high flow state, the possible 
consequence is that its upstream function is in a low state 
because the transport draws more mass or energy out of its 
upstream function than the normal state. Vice versa, high 
volume of the upstream source or storage is a possible 
consequence for a low flow downstream transport. When 
reasoning downstream, high flow transport result in high 
volume in downstream function, while low flow transport 
result in low volume in downstream function. 
3.2  Inference of Indirect Influence 
To reason about indirect influence, it is necessary to separate 
the influencer or participant relation. Table 4 and Table 5 
show the consequence inferences for indirect influence 
between functions.  
The high volume in the downstream sink or storage will give 
a saturation effect, and therefore result in low flow of the 
upstream transport; whereas a low volume will draw more 
mass or energy from the upstream transport. When reasoning 
in downstream direction, high states of the upstream source 
or storage will result in high states of the downstream 
transport and the same with low states.   
Indirect influence with a participant means the transport 
controls the flow level. Therefore, low volume in a 
downstream storage or sink will not give any consequence to 
its upstream transport, the same is the high volume source or 
upstream storage to downstream transport. Only when there’s 
not enough mass or energy in the upstream function or 
saturation in downstream function will influence the transport 
state.   
Table 4. Inference formulas of indirect influence with 
influencer relations 
Inference upstream:   
 
Cause Consequence 
sto3, sin1 
high volume 
tra5, tra7 
low flow 
sto3, sin1 
low volume 
tra5, tra7 
high flow 
Inference downstream: 
 
Cause Consequence 
sou1, sto1 
high volume 
tra1, tra3 
high flow 
sou1, sto1 
low volume 
tra1, tra3 
low flow 
Assumption: tra1, tra3, tra5, and tra7 are enabled. 
Table 5. Inference formulas of indirect influence with 
participant relations 
Inference upstream:   
 
Cause Consequence 
sto4, sin2 
high volume 
tra6, tra8 
low flow 
sto4, sin2 
low volume 
N/A 
Inference downstream: 
 
Cause Consequence 
sou1, sto1 
high volume 
N/A 
sou1, sto1 
low volume 
tra6, tra8 
low flow 
Assumption: tra2, tra4, tra6, and tra8 are enabled. 
3.3  Inference Pattern with balances 
A balance function ensures that its input and output flow are 
equal. When reasoning about direct influence from transport 
to balance, the transport on the other side of the balance has 
to be taken into account. We first examine the balance with 
single in-port and single out-port. Table 6 and Table 7 show 
the inference formulas of single branch balance patterns.  
In Table 6, we can see that the transport function is different 
from a storage function though they all have upstream and 
downstream transports. A balance has the ability to transfer 
the influence from a transport state to the other side if it has 
influencer relation with the other side transport. In such cases 
the state of the balance function won’t be jeopardised (for 
they still regulate the flow so the input is equal to the output).   
When the balance has an influencer relation with its further 
upstream transport, the downstream transport will influence 
across the balance. Otherwise the upstream transport will 
  
 
     
remain the same flow, until the balance filled up when it has 
a low flow downstream transport.  
Table 6. Inference formulas of direct influence with single 
branch balance pattern 
Inference upstream:   
 
 
Cause Consequence 
tra2, tra6 
high flow 
tra1, tra5  
high flow 
tra2, tra6  
low flow 
tra1, tra5  
low flow 
Assumption: bal1, bal3 are enabled and in normal states, and tra1, tra5 
are enabled. 
 
Cause Consequence 
tra4, tra8  
high flow 
bal2-3  
unbalance 
tra4, tra8  
low flow 
bal2-3 
fill 
*tra7, tra3 
low flow 
Assumption: tra3, tra7 are enabled and in normal states, and bal2-3 are 
enabled. *tra3 and tra7 will become low flow eventually when tra4 and 
tra8 are too low. 
Inference downstream:   
 
Cause Consequence 
tra1, tra3 
high flow 
tra2, tra4  
high flow 
tra1, tra3  
low flow 
tra2, tra4  
low flow 
Assumption: bal1, bal2 are enabled and in normal states, and tra1, tra3 
are enabled. 
 
Cause Consequence 
tra5, tra7  
high flow 
bal2, bal4  
fill 
tra5, tra7  
low flow 
bal2,bal4 
unbalance 
*tra6, tra8 
low flow 
Assumption: tra6, tra8 are enabled and in normal states, and bal2-3 are 
enabled. *tra6, tra8 will become low flow eventually when tra5 and 
tra7 are  too low. 
Table 7. Inference formulas of direct influence with single 
branch balance pattern 
Inference upstream:   
 
Cause Consequence 
bal5, bal7 
fill 
tra1, tra3  
low flow 
bal5, bal7 
leak 
tra1, tra3 
high flow 
 
Cause Consequence 
No influence upstream 
Assumption: tra2, tra4, tra6, tra8 are enabled and in normal states, tra1, 
tra3, tra5, tra7 are enabled. 
Inference downstream:   
 
Cause Consequence 
bal1, bal2 
fill 
tra2, tra4  
low flow 
bal1, bal2 
leak 
tra2, tra4 
high flow 
 
Cause Consequence 
No inference downstream. 
Assumption: tra1, tra3, tra5, tra7 are enabled and in normal states, tra2, 
tra4, tra6, tra8 are enabled. 
The downstream reasoning is similar with the upstream 
reasoning. One possible transport state is “leak”, which is not 
a consequence for its neighbouring functions but a possible 
malfunction could cause other consequences. When a 
transport influences the states of balances, the balance may 
become unbalanced if the balance does not have influence on 
the other side transport.  
When reasoning about indirect influence, the participant 
relation will prevent the abnormal state to propagate from the 
balance. (See Table 7) For a transport that have multiple in-
ports and out-ports, we can make the same inference as 
shown in Table 6 and 7 as long as the other transports 
connected to the balance are assumed normal. When 
assuming all the in-port side transports are in normal state, 
the consequence of one abnormal in the out-port side 
transport may affect another out-port transport. The 
inferences are showed in Table 8. 
Table 8 Inference across balance on the out-port side 
Inference upstream: 
 
Cause Consequence 
tra1, tra7 
high low 
tra2, tra8 
low flow 
tra1, tra7 
low flow 
tra2, tra8 
high flow 
 
Cause Consequence 
No inference 
Assumption: tra3-6, tra9-12 are enabled and in normal states and 
tra2-3, tra8-9 are enabled. 
The inference result for the in-port side (downstream) are the 
same as the out port side (upstream). Here still when the 
transport in focus sees the balance as a participant, the 
abnormal states will not propagate to that transport.  
3.4  Producer-Product Relation and Mediate Relation 
From this section, we will examine the cross level inference 
by starting with the two means-end relations namely 
producer-product (PP) and mediate that links flow structures 
directly with a function in another flow structure. The 
formulas are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9. Inference formulas of PP and mediate relation 
Inference from means to end 
 
Cause Consequence 
tra2, tra4 
high low 
tra1, tra3 
high flow 
tra2, tra4 
low flow 
tra1, tra3 
low flow 
Assumption: tra1, tra3 are enabled.  
Transport function can be replaced by other functions, the inference 
result are the same.  
  
 
     
In normal situations, the states in the lower level function 
will give the same impact to the upper level function. 
However, the PP relation indicates adverse states between 
flow structures have no conceptual errors. If this kind of 
influence is observed in the real system, the reasoning rules 
should be altered for those relations.  
3.5  Other Means-end Relation 
Inference formulas for the remaining four means-end 
relations are more arbitrary than the causal reasoning within 
the same levels. The formulas for reasoning across means-
end relations depend on the model object to some degree. 
This means that for any means-end relations that link from 
flow structures to objectives or threats, a success function has 
to be specified so that the reasoning can be done properly. 
The formulas are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10. Inference about other means-end relations 
 
Cause Cnsq. 
 
Cause Cnsq. 
tra6 
state1 
obj3 
true 
tra8 
state1 
obj4 
true 
tra6 
state2 
obj3 
false 
tra8 
state2 
obj4 
false 
 
Cause Cnsq. 
 
Cause Cnsq. 
tra10 
state1 
thr3 
exist 
tra12 
state1 
thr4 
exist 
tra10 
state2 
thr3 
non-
exist 
tra12 
state2 
thr4 
non-
exist 
Assumption: obj3-4 and thr3-4 are available. 
For each objective, some states of the main-function will 
cause it to be in a false state while the other states will cause 
its state to be true. This is the same for the threats. When the 
state set is specified, the reasoning can be done accordingly. 
The fulfilment of an objective can be the condition for 
enabling a function in another flow structure, while the 
existence of a threat may disable a function in another flow 
structure. The consequence reasoning from an objective or 
threat state to another function state is shown in Table 11. 
Table 11. Inference formulas for conditions 
 
Cause Consequence 
obj1 
true 
tra1 
enable 
obj1 
false 
tra1 
disable 
 
Cause Consequence 
thr1 
exist 
tra9 
disable 
thr1 
non-exist 
tra9 
enable 
Assumption: tra1 and tra9 are available. 
Up to this point, all the basic MFM inference formulas are 
introduced. Consequence reasoning of MFM can be done by 
combining all the formulas after a starting node and abnormal 
state for this node. It should be noticeable that the causes and 
consequences in each table are not interchangeable because 
they describe the functional causality of the physical system; 
the temporal aspect of causality is described implicitly in 
each rule that causes must occur prior to their consequences. 
Thus when a consequence becomes the cause within the same 
pattern in MFM, its influence towards the other flow function 
in the pattern can be different from the state that causes it.  
For example, flow function F1 with state (S
F1
1) will lead to 
the a possible consequence that flow function F2 to go into 
state (S
F2
1); then F2 with (S
F2
1) may lead to a possible 
consequence that F1 go into (S
F1
2), when S
F1
1 may differ from 
S
F1
2. 
4. RULE-BASED SYSTEM 
All the reasoning patterns and inference formulas introduced 
in section 3 can be implemented into a rule-based system as 
reasoning rules. Existing rule-based system development 
environments offers inference engines with reasoning 
algorithm that can perform the reasoning automatically. A 
rule-based software tool has been developed by the authors’ 
research group by using Jess (Java Expert System Shell). A 
reasoning rule contains two parts. Jess uses an enhanced 
version of the Rete algorithm to process rules. Rete is a very 
efficient mechanism for solving the difficult many-to-many 
matching problem. Jess has many unique features including 
backwards chaining, inheritance capability, and working 
memory queries. It is suitable for applications when rules 
needed to be fired repeatedly based on newly generated 
information.  
In Jess rules, the left-hand side (LHS) of the rules contain the 
conditions that need to be matched, while the right-hand side 
(RHS) of the rules produce the inference result if the left-
hand side is matched. When running Jess applications, LHS 
of the rule need to be matched with knowledge base facts. 
For MFM reasoning, the LHS contains two parts, one is the 
MFM reasoning patterns, the other is a proposition indicate a 
state of one of the functions in the examined pattern. The 
reasoning engine will try to search the fact base for facts that 
satisfied all the conditions specified in the LHS, and when a 
match is found, the rule will be activated. Then the RHS 
suggest a new proposition according to the inference formula. 
The proposition that implemented in the software including 
1) the information of the inferred function and state; 2) 
justifications that the inference based; 3) the rules that is 
used; and 4) the assumptions associate with the inference. All 
of above information is necessary to test the availability and 
truthfulness of the proposition. 
The reasoning software works in two distinguishable steps. 
One is proposition generation and the other is reasoning 
maintenance. After a trigger (starting node) and the evidences 
(abnormal states) are registered to the reasoning system, the 
inference engine will first generate further propositions based 
on the rules (encoded patterns and formulas), and then test 
the availability of the propositions with all the assumptions.  
Sophisticated strategies and dependency structures are 
  
 
     
included to test the propositions and retract the false or 
conflicted ones. All the propositions, after being generated 
and validated, are organized in a tree structure so that several 
casual paths can be identified. The assumptions and the 
dependency structures are useful for interpret the reasoning. 
Another advantage of using Jess as programming language 
except its fast algorithm is that it is fully integrated with Java 
program and can reason about Java objects (as Jess facts) 
directly. The rule-based system developed by the authors’ 
research group is now integrated with a MFM model editor, a 
Java based model building tool developed by Thunem (et. al. 
2011) so that the reasoning result can be displayed 
graphically with the models.  
5. EXAMPLE 
The watermill example in Fig. 1 is used as an example to 
demonstrate how the rule-based system works. First we 
specify the “tra9” as the trigger with a high flow state.  Then 
the reasoning package is run through the model editor. A 
screen shot of the reasoning result is provided in Fig. 4. From 
the figure, several possible consequence paths are generated 
according to the reasoning rules that introduced in Section 3 
(the final consequences are listed in the upper-right panel in 
Fig. 4); one of the paths that lead to the top objective is 
highlighted in red. 
The reasoning result from the consequence propagation can 
be used to predict system performance and is therefore very 
useful for plant supervision and operation support. Research 
is currently conducted by the authors to explore the 
requirement to design decision support system based on 
MFM. Multi-agent system is proposed as the framework for 
integrated different reasoning modules such as root-cause 
analysis and consequence analysis. (Zhang 2012) 
 
Fig. 4. Screen shot of the software tool 
As can be seen from Fig. 4, the consequences propagation 
which is generated from one trigger node is organized in a 
tree structure. The consequence tree is verified with the 
evidences in the system after the tree is generated. Thus the 
invalid tree branches can be cut off and the affirmed states 
can be highlighted. The current software can perform 
consequence analysis with off-line reasoning cases. For 
develop on-line applications, reasoning depth has to be taking 
into considerations because the reasoning result should be 
compared with real event propagation in the physical system, 
so that the invalid prediction can be cut out. How to 
coordinate the online reasoning with plant data update is still 
an open issue. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper offers a detailed explanation of the consequence 
reasoning with MFM models. The purpose of the analysis is 
that the reasoning analysis can be programed as rule-based 
system which can be used for applicable domains, especially 
for situation assessment. More challenges are expected to 
emerge to develop online applications because they will 
certainly bring critical considerations such as time and 
resources into the system design. As mentioned in section 
2.1, control functions and barriers are excluded in the scope 
of this paper because the reasoning concerns these two can be 
considered as independent analysis tasks. The current 
research (Lind et. al. 2012) also suggested multiple model 
representations for different operation modes. These will 
certainly bring more challenge into expanding the 
consequence reasoning rules. This paper provides a basis of 
the future development for consequence reasoning of MFM 
and its applications. 
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